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1965] RECENT DECISIONS
REAL PROPERTY: "RECIPROCAL NEGATIVE EASMENT" IMPLIED FROM CON-
TRACT, DEED AND GENERAL BUILDING PLAN.-Defendant Country Club
Tower Corporation was formed to build a multi-level, twenty unit apart-
ment building.' Prospective purchasers of the apartments were shown
descriptive brochures prior to and during construction of the building.
2
Before construction of the building, a contract which described the
apartment building as residential property was executed between "Tower"
and a Mrs. Roberts. The contract promised conveyance to her of a
unit in fee simple and one share in a management corporation to be
formed later.3 After the building was constructed, the building and
land were conveyed by Tower to Tower Management Corporation with
the exception of twenty apartments, the garage and a "Sundown Room." '4
Subsequently, Tower conveyed individual apartments to Mrs. Roberts
and nine other purchasers. With the exception of Mrs. Roberts, none
of the purchasers executed contracts with Tower. However, a copy of
the blank contract form upon which the Roberts contract was made,
had been given to each of the purchasers as part of the sales literature.
None of the deeds issued to the plaintiff purchasers contained express
restrictions as to the use of the apartments.5 The defendants attempted
to remodel the ten apartments not yet sold to better suit them for
transient commercial accommodations. 6 The plaintiff apartment owners
obtained an injunction precluding defendant from remodeling for that
purpose. Defendant appealed, contending that because the deeds to the
purchasers contained no express restrictions as to use, no basis for the
1The defendants in the instant case were two corporations: Country Club Tower
Corporation (hereinafter called "Tower") and Tower Management Corporation
(hereinafter called "Management") and one Peters, who initially held the con-
trolling stock in the corporations. Record, vol. 1, p. 221, Thisted v. Country Club
Tower Corporation. In order to analyze this opinion, it has been necessary to consider
the transcript of the district court and briefs of counsel. (Note: ''Appellants" will
hereinafter be cited as Defendants, and ''Respondents'' as Plaintiffs.)
'Record, vol. 2, pp. 458-72. The defendants, engaged a real estate firm to inform
prospective buyers that the building would eliminate all the cares and worries
associated with home ownership. Testimony indicated that no representations were
made to the real estate firm that the apartment building would be used exclusively
for residential purposes. But the firm acted upon that assumption in advertising
the apartments. The blank agreements given to prospective purchasers as brochures,
the architect's drawings and floor plans all represented the basic plan and purpose
of the building as being residential.
'Record, vol. 1, pp. 143-44. Mrs. Roberts executed the contract for purchase prior
to the formation of the Tower Management Corporation. The contracts stated in
detail the residential character of the units to be sold. Tower Management Corpora-
tion was formed for the purpose of managing the "community interest" of the
building. One share in Management corporation was issued to each purchaser, and
each shareholder had a vote in the management of the common property. Record,
vol. 1, pp. 227-29. Note the provisions for regulation of this type of building-unit
ownership passed by the 1965 Montana Legislature in REvisED CODES OF MONTANA,
1947, §§ 67-2301 to 67-2342. (REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are hereinafter cited as
R.C.M.)
'The apartments were later conveyed by Tower to the individual purchasers.
'Record, vol. 1, pp. 158-59. An agreement attached to the deed stated, in effect, that
if the apartment owner wished to sell or sublease his unit he must get a written
consent from the stockholders of Management or allow the corporation a "first
refusal" on an offer to sell the apartment.
'Record, vol. 1, pp. 253-60. There was conflicting evidence of the defendant's purpose
in remodeling its apartments.
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issuance of the injunction existed. Held, judgment affirmed. The court
said an implied equitable servitude attached to the plaintiffs' apartments
restricting use to residential purposes. The court further stated that
implied reservations or grants of easements of necessity can exist in
Montana and expressly overruled Simonson v. McDonald7 insofar as it
held to the contrary. Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corporation, 22 St.
Rptr. 694, 405 P.2d 432 (Mont. 1965).
In determining the plaintiffs' implied rights in the instant case, s
the court was confronted with a choice between two separate easements:
implied easements of necessity, and implied reciprocal negative ease-
ments.9 Implied easements of necessity are easements which involve
the use of a servient tenement by one who holds the dominant tenement
in fee.10 They are implied because the use of the servient tenement is
necessary for the beneficial utilization of the dominant tenement."
Generally, the implied easement of necessity is applied to a right of way.
12
While the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements in-
volves a restriction of the uses to which the servient tenement may be
7131 Mont. 494, 311 P.2d 982 (1957). Simonson involved a claim of a reserved right
of way of necessity, and the court construed R.C.M. 1947, § 67-1616 as providing
that even where the lands which are the dominant tenement and the servient tene-
ment are derived from a common grantor, an easement of necessity will not be
implied if the right of way can be obtained by eminent domain proceedings.
'The first part of the opinion is of interest insofar as it indicates an alternative
solution to the case. Instant case at 436-38. The court construed the parol evidence
statutes, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-401-13, 93-401-17, and held that the Roberts' contract
was admissible to show the circumstances at the time the deed was executed. The
court cited two Montana cases: Bridges & Co. v. Bank of Fergus County, 77 Mont.
524, 251 Pac. 1057 (1926) and Platt v. Clark, 141 Mont. 376, 378 P.2d 235 (1963).
Both of these cases dealt with agreements the validity of which were contested.
The statutes cited above state that evidence outside the written agreement is admis-
sible only where (1) mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the
pleadings and (2) where the validity of the agreement is in dispute. The deed to
the purchasers in the instant case was not being contested either as to imperfection
or as to validity.
The court also decided that the Roberts' contract had not been merged into the
subsequent deed. It construed R.C.M. 1947, § 13-708 and cited Story v. Montforton,
112 Mont. 24, 113 P.2d 507 (1941). See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1310, 1312 n. 3, which
distinguishes the Story case from the general doctrine of merger.
Defendant had argued that if the Roberts' contract were enforceable, the plain-
tiffs could not claim under it because of their lack of privity with defendant, and
because they were not third party beneficiaries. Brief for Appellant, pp. 45-46.
Defendant cited McKeever v. Oregon Mortgage Co., 60 Mont. 270, 198 Pac. 752
(1921) as holding that plaintiffs must show that the contract was made expressly
for their benefit to claim under it. The plaintiff contended that the apartment
building was indivisible insofar as the right to restricted use was concerned and if
any apartment in the building were used for any purpose in violation of the con-
tract's provision, it would give Mrs. Roberts a right to restrain defendants. Brief
for Respondent, pp. 39-41. Because the court found that defendant had violated the
Robert's contract, and because it adopted plaintiffs' argument it would appear the
injunction could have been affirmed solely on this basis. Instant case at 438.
'See note 25 infra. See also text at note 29 infra.
"Himler Coal Co. v. Kirk, 205 Ky. 666, 266 S.W. 355 (1924).
Ulbid., see 3 TIFrANY, LAW or REAL PROPzRY § 792 (3rd ed. 1939). See also Herrin
v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 Pac. 323 (1912), Violet v. Martin, 62 Mont. 335, 205
Pac. 221 (1922), which are the cases Simonson v. McDonald, supra note 7, over-
ruled, but nevertheless state the general rule on easements of necessity of rights of
way.
23 TxnY, op. cit. supra note 11, § 793. 2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 27 [1965], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/8
RECENT DECISIONS
put, it does not involve physical use of that tenement. 13 Because each
estate coming within the scope of the reciprocal negative casement is
at the same time a dominant and a servient tenement, the restriction
can be enforced by either party against the other. It is thus distinguish-
able from a purely negative easement which may be enforced only by
the party who holds the dominant tenement. 14 Reciprocal negative ease-
ments have usually been applied to residential subdivisions, 15 and may
be created by either implication or express covenants.' 6 Generally, the
following elements are necessary before a court will find an implied
reciprocal negative casement. Individual lots are conveyed out of a
larger tract by a common grantor.17 Usually, at least one of the deeds
contains a statement of the restriction which is then implied in the
deeds of the other lots.'8 The party against whom the restriction is
sought to be enforced must have had notice, either actual or construc-
tive, of the existence of the restriction.' 9 And, finally, the party who
seeks to enforce the restriction must show that he is a rightful bene-
ficiary.20
The court in the instant case apparently confused these doctrines.
The court observed that the deed from "Tower" to "Management" of
the land and building, reserving twenty apartments, contained no ex-
press reservation by Tower of a right of access to those apartments. 2'
Also, there was no provision made for Tower to provide its apartments
with heat, electricity, or water since this obviously would require passage
through the structural portions of the building already conveyed to
Management. The court concluded that "of necessity" these rights of
access must be implied from the fact of creation of separate ownership
of the building and apartments. The question is then raised by the
court: can the right of restricted use be implied from the very nature
of the building plan and operation?2 2  The court called this right an
implied equitable servitude, and concluded that the implied equitable
servitude attached to the transfers of the apartments and restricted their
18Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 226, 206 N.W. 496, 60 A.L.R. 1212 (1925), the leading
case describing the elements of reciprocal negative easements. See Allen v. City of
Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317, 36 L.R.A.(n.s.) 890 (1911); Cook v. Bandeed,
356 Mich. 146, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959); and Lanski v. Montealegre, 361 Mich. 44, 104
N.W.2d 772 (1960).
"Ibid.
w5 bid.
162 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 382, at 540 (1962 repl.). The author makes the
distinction: "True easements are legal interests in land as distinguished from the
restriction arising out of a restrictive covenant." See Leasehold Estates, Inc. v.
Fulbro Holding Co., 47 N.J. Super. 534, 136 A.2d 423 (1957).
TSee cases cited in Annot., 45 L.R.A.(n.s.) 966-68.
'McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771 (1921). See also cases cited note
13 supra. McQuade contained very similar facts to the instant case, with the exception
that there was an express statement of the restriction in at least one of the deeds in
the McQuade case. The court held that the grantor could not change the character of
his lot in violation of the restrictions stated in the deeds issued to the grantees.
"
9 See cases cited supra notes 13 and 18.
'See cases cited in Annot., 21 Am. St. Rep. 487.
'Instant case at 438.
'Id. at 439.
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use.23 The court then summarily stated that in Montana there can be
implied reservations or implied grants of easements of necessity. These
implied easements exist "by reason of our statutes .... *24 The court
found that, insofar as the holding of Simonson v. McDonald stated to the
contrary it was expressly overruled under the facts and circumstances
existing in the instant case.
The issue to be decided in the instant case was whether the plaintiffs
had an enforceable right to restricted use. The district court found that
plaintiffs' rights to restricted use were based on an implied reciprocal
negative easement; it did not consider rights implied of necessity. 25 The
confusion created by the opinion as to the grounds for the court's de-
cision can be attributed to two omissions: first, a failure to specifically
identify the property right the court attributed to plaintiffs whether
implied of necessity or by reciprocal negative easement; and second,
the failure to give the reasons used in arriving at the conclusion. The
opinion relies heavily upon the plaintiffs' brief. An examination of
plaintiff's argument will indicate the reasons for the court's discussion
of the existence of an implied easement of necessity,2 6 as well as showing
the logic used in coming to the conclusion upon which the decision is
based.
Plaintiffs' basic proposition was that the defendant had sold them
a "concept for a way of life,"'27 and not merely a piece of real estate.
Plaintiffs used this proposition to show that the actions of defendant
were sufficient basis for an implication of a right in the plaintiffs to
restrict the use of the apartment building. The proposition was based
upon three instruments.2 8 The first was the contract executed between
Tower and Mrs. Roberts. The second instrument was the deed conveying
"Td. at 440. The court labels the plaintiffs' rights as "implied conditions," and
"implied equitable servitude." The latter phrase could be considered to refer to
either the implied easement of necessity, or the implied reciprocal negative easement.
"Ibid.
"The district court in Record, vol. 1, pp. 120-22 found that the Roberts' contract
referred to the entire building which had been represented as an apartment building
for residential purposes and that the contract and the oral representations of the
promoters estopped defendants from changing the use of the building. The court
then found that the execution of the contracts, the deeds to the apartments, the deed
from ''Tower'' to ''Management'' of the building, the formation of Tower Manage-
ment Corporation:
rAlnd the representations made by said promoters have created reciprocal negative
easements which extend to all of the apartments in the building, whether the deeds
contained the separate agreement or not, and such reciprocal negative easements extend
also to those apartments still in the ownership of Country Club Tower Corporation and
these easements include the right, appurtenant to each apartment, to have all of the
other apartments. . .devoted to quiet residential utilization. . . .to have a voice in the
selection of persons to whom said apartments may be transferred or leased and the right
to quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the premises ...
"Brief for Respondent, pp. 41-47. The court adopted parts of plaintiffs' brief into
its opinion but, by omitting other parts, lost the clarity and continuity of the argu-
ment. In an effort to elucidate the apparent purpose of the court, a summary of
plaintiffs' argument is set forth.
"Brief for Respondent, pp. 26-27. Respondents specifically set out the elements of the
concept: that each apartment would be owned in fee simple; each apartment would
be a luxury, residential apartment in a high class district, an exclusive, socially
acceptable place to live, with quiet, secluded tranquil surroundings; each owner would
have the ability to select or pass upon the persons who would be his neighbors.
"Brief for Respondent, pp. 44-47.
[Vol. 27,
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the building and land from Tower to Management. Plaintiffs argued
that this deed illustrated that not all of the property interests in the
building were conveyed or reserved by deed. 29 The court adopted this
portion of plaintiffs' brief in the opinion,30 but failed to state the reasons
for the discussion of easements of necessity in the opinion. It is sub-
mitted that the court had the same purpose as the plaintiffs: to demon-
strate that not all of the .property rights which were created or passed
were in the deeds. The third instrument provided by defendant was the
deed delivered by Tower to each of the plaintiff purchasers. Attached
to the deed was an agreement which provided for a "first right of
refusal" to be given to Management. 3' The agreement was quoted in
the opinion, further evidence that the court adopted the argument of
plaintiffs and accepted their theory of the sale of a "concept. 3 2
Plaintiffs discussed two issues which the arguments of both sides
had presented :3 3  whether the deeds must contain express rights to
restricted use in order for such rights to be enforced; and whether the
right to restricted use could be implied from the Roberts' contract and
the general building plan and operation. It is submitted that upon
these issues the court based its decision, and not upon an implied ease-
ment of necessity.3 4
Plaintiffs argued that by characterizing the units as "apartments '35
in the deeds to the purchasers, the defendant intended the ordinary
meaning of the word. Plaintiffs' brief set forth various definitions show-
ing that the word "apartment" meant essentially a separate suite of
rooms in a building, which were used permanently for residential pur-
poses.3 6 Therefore, the word "apartment" gave the units the character
of being apartments and that character passed apurtenant with the units
in the conveyance to plaintiffs. In support of this contention plaintiffs
cited Montana statutes which provide for the passage of those things in-
cidental and appurtenant to a conveyance or contract.37 These statutes
1Id. at p. 45.
"Instant case at 438.
31Brief for Respondent, p. 47. See note 3 supra.
*'Instant case at 439.3Brief for Appellant, pp. 54-55. Brief for Respondent, pp. 47-59.
"Instant case at 439. The court recognizes the issues set forth by plaintiffs, and
states that:
we must decide whether defendants' argument. . must be adopted by this court. . .and
whether there are, in addition to the conditions found in the Roberts' contract and
deed, from the very nature of the building plan and operation. . .implied conditions
and equitable servitudes that require the use of said building for residential
use....
wBrief for Respondent, pp. 49-51.
'Old. at 50. Plaintiff cited: Scanlan v. La Coste, 59 Colo. 449, 149 Pac. 835 (1915),
Pierce v. Kelner, 304 Pa. 509, 156 Atl. 61 (1931). Plaintiffs contended that there
is a clear distinction between "apartment" and "hotel room" or "motel room."
-R.C.M. 1947, § 13-722. "All things that in law or usage are considered as incidental
to a contract, or as necessary to carry it into effect, are implied therefrom, unless
some of them are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things of the same
class are deemed to be excluded."
R.C.M. 1947, § 67-1607.
A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in
favor thereof an easement to use other real proprty of the person whose estate
is transferred in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was
1965]
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were assimilated into the opinion of the court 38 with the comment that
"we think certain Montana statutes, under the facts in this case are con-
trolling." The court did not state the reasons why it used these statutes.
The court had previously relied upon "our statutes" for its conclusion
that implied easements exist in Montana. 39 But the opinion gives no
indication that these were the statutes the court had in mind when it
made that statement. Therefore, in light of the close adherence to plain-
tiffs' argument, it is submitted that the court's purpose in using the
cited statutes was the same as plaintiffs'. Namely, that the word "apart-
ment" passed an appurtenant character in the transfers to plaintiffs,
and therefore the restriction was not required to be expressed in the deed.
Following the statement of the statutes and without further com-
ment, the court came to this conclusion: "We are further of the opinion
that under all the facts shown in evidence here. . .an implied equitable
servitude attached to the transfers of the apartments in question, re-
quiring the use of the apartments for residential purposes only. '40 There
is no statement of the reasoning upon which the court based this con-
clusion. It must be concluded, therefore, that the reasoning again fol-
lowed plaintiffs' argument.
Plaintiffs argued that the rights to restricted use were implied
from the actions of defendants in selling the concept. The right was
denominated an implied reciprocal negative easement. Specifically, plain-
tiffs contended that the general building scheme taken in conjunction
with the representations made to plaintiffs induced the plaintiffs to buy,
and thereby created an implied reciprocal negative easement. This ease-
ment gave plaintiffs the right to restrict the building to residential pur-
poses. The right could be enforced against the other apartment owners
and against the common grantor, the defendant.
4
'
obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the
benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed.
R.C.M. 1947, § 13-721. "Stipulations which are necessary to make a contract reason-
able, or conformable to usage, are implied, in respect to matters concerning which
the contract manifests no contrary intention."
R.C.M. 1947, § 49-114. "One who grants a thing is presumed to grant also what-
ever is essential to its use.''
R.C.M. 1947, § 49-121. "That which ought to have been done is to be regarded as
done, in favor of him to whom, and against him from whom, performance is due."
R.C.M. 1947, § 67-606. The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the
grant, or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired."
1Instant case at 440.
"See above at footnote 24.
'0Instant case at 440.
4Brief for Respondents, pp. 51-56. The defendants had cited California cases, which
the court in the instant case mentions, but not by name. The cases were Werner v.
Graham, 181 Cal. Rep. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919), and McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal.
Rep. 152, 215 Pac. 678 (1923). The California court refused to enforce reciprocal
negative easements in favor of common grantees against other grantees because
there was no provision expressed in the deed showing which estate was to benefit
from the restriction. Because such "equitable servitudes" are in derogation of the
common law, they must be construed strictly. The court in the instant case does
not explicitly say whether or not it is following or rejectiuag this line of authority,
but it can be assumed it has rejected them because judgment was affirmed for
plaintiffs.
[Vol. 27,
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The court in the instant case must have concluded that an implied
reciprocal negative easement restricting use had resulted from the Ro-
berts' contract and the general building plan. 42 The district court called
the right an implied reciprocal negative easement, and did not mention
equitable servitudes, as did the supreme court.43  Since the right of
plaintiffs only restricts the use of the other apartments, it can be dis-
tinguished from an affirmative right allowing use of the land of another.
Implied negative easements, as distinguished from those created by
instrument, have been classified as negative equitable easements. 44 The
court in the instant case was exercising its equity jurisdiction. 45 Negative
equitable easements which limit the use of land to residential purposes
for the benefit of an entire tract of land have been found to be reciprocal
negative easements.4 6 The existence of purely negative easements had
been recognized in Montana prior to the instant case. 47 This case is,
however, one of first impression insofar as it recognized an implied
reciprocal negative easement.
Two extremes exist in connection with the basic elements required
by various states to justify the implication of a reciprocal negative ease-
ment. California 48 requires express statement in the deeds, not only of
the restriction but also of the estate which it is to benefit. New York,49
on the other hand, has implied a restrictive easement merely from the
existence of a general building scheme. The decision of the court in the
instant case at least comes within these two extremes.
In the instant case the defendant was a common grantor. If the
situation is analogized to that of a subdivision, the apartments were
lots conveyed out of the larger tract. According to the terms of the
Roberts' contract and the representations made to the buyers, the apart-
ments would be used only for residential purposes. 50 This necessarily
would result in benefit to the apartment owners. Therefore, plaintiffs
were the parties to be benefited by the restriction, and had sufficient
standing to enforce the restriction against the defendant grantor.51
The only question in the instant case was whether the plaintiffs had
a right to restricted use based on an implied reciprocal negative ease-
ment. The implication of reciprocal negative easements gives effect to the
"Instant case at 339. See note 34 supra.
"*See note 25 supra.
"2 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 540.
"Instant case at 435.
"See note 13 supra.
Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowery, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792, 110 A.L.R.
605 (1937).
'See note 41 supra.
'Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N.Y. Rep. 105 (1862). The New York Court of
Appeals implied a restriction where it found that the building scheme was permanent
and obviously intended to benefit the lots already conveyed as well as those retained.
The lots had been conveyed without express restrictions in the deeds, and sold only
with verbal representations. The court held that there was sufficient notice to the
grantee from the building scheme to allow enforcement of the restriction against him.
'See notes 3 and 25 supra.
"See text and note 20 supra.
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probable intent of the parties rather than to the practical necessity
of the situation. They are not implied because they are necessary for
the beneficial use of the property. In the instant case the apartments
could be used as apartments regardless of the existence of a reciprocal
negative easement.
The supreme court's opinion raised the question of whether implied
easements of necessity exist in Montana. This problem was originally
raised by counsel for the sole purpose of illustrating that not all the
property rights, which were passed to plaintiffs in the purchase of the
apartments, were expressly stated in the deeds.5 2 The court must have
been concerned with implied easements of necessity only as an aside.
Any conclusion made on easements of necessity is obiter dictum. It fol-
lows that, if the court "overruled" Simonson v. McDonald53 upon the facts
of the instant case, then Simonson has not been overruled because the facts
of the instant case did not concern easements of necessity.
The rule of Simonson also remains valid if the court overruled it on
the facts in the instant case dealing with implied reciprocal negative ease-
ments. Simonson held only that easements of necessity may not be implied
in connection with a right of way, if eminent domain proceedings are
available.54 Simonson explicitly limited its holding to the presence of
those facts. Application of the rule of Simonson to implied easements
other than easements of necessity is unjustified.
The decision of the instant case was made in the exercise of the
court's equity jurisdiction5 5 and it is submitted that while the existence
of implied reciprocal negative easements in Montana must have been
recognized by the court, it did not overrule Simonson v. McDonald.
JOHN R. GORDON
RAMIFICATIONS OF JAIL-BASED PROBATION UPON SUSPENDED IMPOSITION OF
SENTENCE.-Petitioner pleaded guilty to grand larceny. At his request
the court placed petitioner on the alcoholic rehabilitation program used
in the First Judicial District, suspending the imposition of sentence and
placing petitioner on probation.1 The conditions of probation required
"
2See text and note 29 supra.
"Instant case at 440. "Under the facts and circumstances existing here that holding
is expressly overruled.''
"Simonson v. MacDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 501, 311 P.2d 982, 986 (1957).
'Instant case at 435. It is to be noted that cases of this type, decided in equity
have generally been based in some measure on the courts finding an estoppel. See
Bimson v. Butman, 3 App. Div. 198, 38 N.Y. 209 (1896). Argument on this particular
point was raised by counsel from both sides, but apparently the court in the instant
case considered it unnecessary for its decision. Brief for Appellant, pp. 52-55. Brief
for Respondent, pp. 59-67. Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 60-68. It is noted that
paragraph three of the findings of the district court stated the existence of an
estoppel. See note 25 supra.
'REvisED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-7832 provides that whenever any person has
been found guilty of a crime or offense upon verdict or plea, the court may adjudge
[Vol. 27,
8
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